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The New Refugees and the Old Treaty:
Persecutors and Persecuted in the Twenty-First Century
Andrew I. Schoenholtz*
Abstract
When the fledgling U.N. negotiated a treat to protect refugees after the Second World
War, member states focused on Europe as well as on events causing forced migration that
occurredprior to 1951. No one imagined that cross-border escape from persecution would
become a globalphenomenon and remain one more than sixty years later, or that this human
rights treat would be needed in the twent-first centuy. In fact, as increasednumbers of asylum
seekers from developing countries reached the most developed regions of the world during the last
thirty years, critics have questioned the merits of this treat and argued that the Refugee
Convention has become outmoded and obsolete.
This Article considers how well suited this treat isfor the protection of refugeesfleeing
persecution in today's world. The authorfirst looks at how the nature of the state itself has
evolved andfinds that too many governments today fail atproviding significantportions of their
citizengy with the most basic level of human security. A new cast ofpersecutors apartfrom the
state now exerts authori andpower in such societies, targetingparticularsocietalgroups using
new forms of persecution. Examining how states have adapted this multilateral agreement to
these changing circumstances, the authorfinds that this treaty continues to be vital in protecting
the human rights of refugees thanks to two important treay elements: a clear andfundamental
pupose to protect individuals whose governments have been unwilling or unable to do so, and
flexible terms that have enabledjurists and government officials to adapt the refugee definition
to the changing nature of forced migration. Accordingl, the author's analysis confirms the
conclusion of the InternationalLaw Commission Spedal Rapporteur on Treaties over Time
that "subsequentpracticeby the parties may guide an evolutive interpretationof a treaty."

Professor from Practice, Georgetown University Law Center; Director, Human Rights Institute;
Director, Center for Applied Legal Studies; Deputy Director, Institute for the Study of
International Migration. The author wishes to thank Emily Naser-Hall (LL.M., Georgetown 2013)
and Lily Hough .D. Candidate, Georgetown 2016) for their excellent and dedicated research,
without which this Article could not have been written.
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"The sine qua non of the political commonwealth is to defend the dtizen from the invasion of
foreigners and the injuries of one another.""

I. INTRODUCTION: PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF REFUGEES
When governments established the U.N. in 1945, war and persecution had
displaced over forty million people in Europe alone. Today's state system
continues to produce large numbers of forced migrants in connection with such
causes. At the same time, new forms of displacement related to natural disasters
and climate change challenge governments and civil society to respond in
humane and effective ways to ensure that the crisis needs of all people are met in
a non-discriminatory fashion.2 Experts agree that new norms beyond those
established for persecution and war refugees need to be developed.3 As the
international community carefully considers how to deal with the latest forms of
forced migration, officials, advocates, and scholars of human rights might learn
from the evolution and implementation of the core human rights treaty on
forced migration created in 1951-the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Refugee Convention").4 For that reason alone, why and how this
treaty matters today merits reflection.
An even more compelling reason to investigate this human rights treaty is
that State Parties have tried for some time to minimize its relevance to today's
forced migrants. In a 2000-2001 report for the Australian Parliament, one
researcher called the treaty "outdated" and "obsolete." 5 In contrast, I argue that
I

Andrew E. Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee, 95 ETHICS 274, 278 (1985) (quoting THOMAS

HOBBES,

LEVIATHAN 105 (1651)).
2

3

4

5

See generally Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework, 16 GOBAL
GOVERNANCE 361 (2010).
See, for example, id. at 362 (addressing the protection needs of survival migrants who face "an
existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution" and who fall
outside the scope of the international refugee regime) (internal quotation marks omitted); Etienne
Piguet, Climate Change and Forced Migration (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Research
Paper No. 153 2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/47a316182.pdf (discussing the protection
needs of environmental refugees).
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 25, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter
Refugee Convention].
Adrienne Millbank, The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention (2000), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/About-Parliament/Parliamentary-Departments/Parliamentary-Library/
pubs/rp/rp0001 /01RP05. This same researcher more recently called for the Australian
government to "ditch" the Refugee Convention. Adrienne Millbank, Ditch the Refugee Convention,
THE AUSTRALIAN, May 3, 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/
ditch-the-un-refugee-convention/story-e6frgd0x-1226634223906.
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the treaty created in 1951 to address then-contemporary international
displacement is reasonably alive and well with respect to today's persecuted
refugees and has enabled states to protect many of these particular forced
migrants.
This study, then, will closely examine the Refugee Convention's application
to the changing nature of forced migration. As such, it aims to contribute to the
recent and ongoing examinations being conducted by the International Law
Commission regarding "Treaties over time/Subsequent agreements and
subsequent practice in relation to interpretation of treaties."6
My focus will be on the evolution of the substantive law in terms of whom
this treaty protects as refugees pursuant to the international definition, which has
remained unchanged since its creation. States negotiated this definition in a
particular Western historical context: the aftermath of the Second World War
and the very early days of the Cold War. How viable is this definition in today's
world?
I will argue that this definition possesses core characteristics that have
enabled adjudicators, advocates, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), and scholars to apply it to the protection needs of
persecuted refugees in today's world. While this has not occurred without
struggle and challenges, my claim is that the "refugee" definition, now in its
seventh decade of life, has proven adaptable to the changing nature of
persecution.
One clarification before I present this analysis: I am on record elsewhere
critiquing a significant limitation of the international refugee regime as well as
ways that states have implemented the treaty. v While the 1951 Convention
addresses the protection of persecuted refugees, it does not deal with the
protection of refugees fleeing conflict that does not involve targeted, individual
persecution. States have had many opportunities since establishing the Refugee
Convention to develop a global treaty for conflict refugees, but one does not yet
exist. That subject continues to deserve the attention of states, advocates, and
scholars. But it does not take away from the considerable accomplishments of
the 1951 Refugee Convention. As to the shortcomings in implementation, an
important role of researchers is to document such problems as they occur. But

6

Treaties

Over Time/Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to
Interpretation of Treaties, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, http://legal.un.org/ilc/
summaries/I1 1.htm (last visited May 1, 2015).

7

See,for example, Andrew i. Schoenholtz, Improving Legal Frameworks, in THE UPROOTED: IMPROVING
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES TO FORCED MIGRATION 30-72 (Susan F. Martin et al. eds., 2005);
Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11, 36 COUwM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REV. 323 (2005).
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such shortcomings should not prevent us from recognizing implementation
successes.

II. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE LAW REGIME
Born in 1951 in the aftermath of the failure to save the persecuted who
perished at the hands of the Nazis, the Refugee Convention set out both to
protect refugees from persecution and to ensure their widest possible exercise of
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination, as affirmed by the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through this treaty substituting a
willing sovereign for an irresponsible or incapable one, State Parties created an
international legal regime that respected the stabilizing and humanitarian value
of the state-citizen relationship. Via the non-refoulement obligation set out in
Article 33, states committed themselves not to return an individual who
reasonably feared serious harm in her state of nationality or residence. The treaty
strongly encourages governments to naturalize refugees, and most of the
Refugee Convention provisions speak to a set of political, social, and economic
rights as well as State Party obligations that enable refugees to rebuild their lives
through a relationship with a new sovereign.
Of course, this international agreement started out principally as a
European treaty limited in time to events occurring before 1951 that had caused
cross-border displacement. In fact, Contracting States could limit their
obligations to the territory of Europe.' During the Convention's adolescence,
these temporal and geographical limitations became outmoded when the
General Assembly called on UNHCR primarily to protect and assist large
numbers of refugees in the developing world. Accordingly, in 1967, the General
Assembly adopted the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 9 removing
these limitations and essentially universalizing the international refugee
definition and the rights set forth in the Convention.
In the 1950s and 1960s, most of the Convention refugees in the West fled
the Communist states controlled by the Soviet Union and migrated as
individuals. The exception was the mass exodus of 200,000 Hungarians fleeing
the Soviet repression of the 1956 uprising.0 The treaty faced a special challenge,
because the agreement only applied to "events occurring" before 1951. Dr. Paul

8

See Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(B)(1).

9

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967)
[hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, State of the World's Refugees-2000: Fifty Years of
Humanitarian Action 26-27, 29-30 (2000).

10
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Weis, the Legal Advisor to the High Commissioner, did what jurists, legal
experts, and advocates have done ever since when presented with this problem
of interpretation: he analyzed how the treaty applied to a contemporary
situation. In this case, he articulated the connections between the causes of the
1956 refugee flight and events that occurred before 1951."

III. CHALLENGES TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
The Refugee Convention has spent much of its adult life under attack in
both developed and developing countries. Starting especially in the 1980s,
European states began to interpret the refugee definition more strictly in
response to larger flows of individuals from the developing world applying for
refugee status through formal screening procedures. 2 The rate of recognition in
Western Europe fell from forty-two percent in 1983 to sixteen percent in 1996.13
Western states acted to some degree as if the political purposes of the treaty, less
important as the Cold War waned, mattered more than the humanitarian ones.14
States began restricting territorial access to refugees in significant ways. The
Reagan Administration established an agreement with Baby Doc Duvalier to
return Haitians interdicted on the high seas unless U.S. officials determined on
the spot that they needed Refugee Convention protection.'" In reality, this meant
that the U.S. returned over 22,000 Haitians who tried to reach the U.S. on boats
6
and admitted around one hundred who could then apply for asylum.'
11 See id.at 30-31.
12 See Jerzy Sztucki, Who Is a Refugee? The Convention Definition: Universal or Obsolete?, in REFUGEE
RIGHTS AND REAUTIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND REGIMES 55, 69-71 (Frances
Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
13 Id. at 71. In 1996, another ten percent were allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds. Id. at 7172.
14 See generaly Charles B. Keely, The InternationalRefugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters, 35
INT'L MIGRATION REV. 303 (2001); see also Schoenholtz, Improving LegalFrameworks, supra note 7, at
39-46; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, State-Centered Refugee 1aw: From Resettlement to Containment, in
MISTRUSTING REFUGEES 257, 262, 265 (E. Valentine Daniel &John Chr. Knudsen eds., 1995).
15 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Couni, 509 U.S. 155, 159-62 (1993).
16 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES-2012: IN SEARCH OF
SOLIDARITY

176 (2012) [hereinafter

STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2012].

The U.S. continues

to interdict asylum seekers on the high seas and, at times, return them without determining
whether they are refugees. Other countries have followed suit. Australia started doing so in 2001;
in contrast with the U.S. direct returns, Australia made some determination (though not
necessarily with a fair process) as to an individual's need for protection. See Jessica Howard, To
Deter and Deny: Australia and the Interdiction of Asylum Seekers, 21 REFUGEE 35, 36 (2003). Most
recently, Italy and Spain, with the assistance of the European Union through FRONTEX, have
taken this to the next legal level and teamed up with Libya, Senegal, and Mauritania, respectively,
to interdict asylum seekers and other migrants in the territorial waters of these states before they
can reach the high seas. See FRONTEX Risk Analysis Unit, Reportfor the Second.Quarter of 2010
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The number of asylum seekers that reached the West increased
significantly over time, and the origins of those claiming protection shifted from
Eastern Europe to the developing world. Between 1985 and 1995, the
industrialized world received about five million asylum applications.'" Western
nations responded to these increases and demographic shifts by more
aggressively controlling their borders, changing their procedures, and revising
their laws and policies in a variety of ways. To limit access to their territories,
some states established pre-clearance and pre-inspection programs abroad. 8
Some imposed new visa requirements on nationals from countries that produce
refugees. Several began to detain arriving asylum seekers. Many Western States
created fast-track asylum procedures aimed at "manifestly unfounded" claims. t9
Some established filing deadlines. Aimed in part to control abuse, many
European governments imposed new policies regarding claimants who came
from what were called "safe countries of origin" as well as those who had passed
through "safe third countries." 2 Western governments started to deny asylum
claims where persecution was not countrywide (invoking so-called "internal
flight alternatives"), 21 and a few European states denied protection involving
certain non-state agents of persecution.2 2
According to Professor Aleinikoff, the exilic bias of post-World War II
refugee law lost its appeal in the developed West in the 1980s, such that "states,

17

(April-June) 5-6 (2010). This approach continues to dominate European state thinking in the
context of over 220,000 arrivals by sea and more than 3,200 deaths at sea in 2014. See Judith
Sunderland & Bill Frelick, EU's Approach to Migrants: HumanitarianRhetoric, Inhumane Treatment, Apr.
15, 2015, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/judith-sunderland-billfrelick/euE2%80%99s-approach-to-migrants-humanitarian-rhetoric-inhuman.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, State of the World's Refugees-1997-98: A Humanitarian

18

Agenda 184 (1997) [hereinafter State of the World's Refugees 1997].
See Schoenholtz, Improving Legal Frameworks, supra note 7, at 39-46; STATE OF THE WORLD'S

19

REFUGFES 1997, supra note 17, at 191-94; U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, STATE OF THE
WORLD'S REFUGETES-1-993: THF CHALLENGES OF PROTECTION 38-39 (1993) [hereinafter STATE
OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 19931.
See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, The Problem of Manifestl Unfounded or Abusive Applcation; for

20

Refugee Status or Asylum, EXCOM Conclusion No. 30 (1983), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
3ae68c6i18.html.
Schoenholtz, Improving Legal Frameworks, supra note 7, at 43-45.

21

See Nergis Canofe, The Fragmented Nature of the International Refugee Regime and Its

22

Consequences: A Comparative Analysis of the Applications of the 1951 Convention, in CRITICAL
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL. REFUGI:E LAW: STRATEGIES TOWARD INTERPRETIVE HARMONY 174,
176-78 Games C. Simeon ed., 2010) (discussing the use of internal flight alternatives as legal
foundation for limiting access to asylum as applied to Sikh activists returned to other regions of
India, Tamils to southern Sri Lanka, and Turkish Kurds to Istanbul); see also id. at 199-200
(describing European restrictions, such as lower grant rates, returns, and procedural limitations).
See STATE OF THI; WORLD'S REFUGEEiS 1997, supra note 17, at 191-94.
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as matters of domestic law, have adopted narrow readings of the LC]onvention's
definition of refugee."23 States replaced the original exilic bias with what
Aleinikoff calls "source control bias" and "policies of containment."2 4 The laws,
policies, and practices described above support this thesis.
Some governments, analysts, and journalists directly attacked the Refugee
Convention. Some states reportedly threatened to opt out of the treaty.2" For
example, the British head of the Conservative Party and Opposition to Prime
Minister Blair pledged to pull out of the 1951 Convention.2 6 In a 2000 paper
prepared for the Australian Parliament, commentator Adrienne MilIbank
asserted that "the problem with the Convention is that it was developed in and
for a different era,' 2' and "the Convention definition of refugee is outdated, as is
its notion of exile as a solution to refugee problems. 2 8 Millbank echoes this
criticism repeatedly, and she notes that some Austrian and British leaders have
espoused similar views.29
Concerned about large numbers of refugees requesting asylum in the U.K.
under the Refugee Convention, Prime Minister Blair's government considered
removing asylum seekers who reached the U.K. to protection areas near their
countries of origin in 2003."o The deported asylum seekers would have had to
stay in these UN zones for six months before processing of their claims. The
opposition party leadership pushed the concept further to include a strict quota

23

Aleinikoff, supranote 14, at 262.

24

Id.at 263, 265 (emphasis omitted).

25

See Eiko R. Thielemann & Torun Dewan, The Myth of Free-riding: Refugee Protection and Implicit

26

Burden-sharing,29 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 351, 354 (2006).
See Howard Defends Immigration Stance, BBC Ni Ws, Sept. 23, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

27

hi/uk news/politics/3682310.stm.
Millbank, The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at 2, 4.

28

Id.at 3.

29

For example, she states: "The crux of criticism is that the Convention is obsolete and
inappropriate to deal with contemporary challenges." Id.at 5. "The essence of criticism of the
1951 UN Refugee Convention is that it is anachronistic." Id. at 6 (internal citation omitted). She
provides examples of Western leaders who espouse this view: "In 1998 the Austrian Presidency of
the EU suggested replacing the Convention with an EU asylum law 'which meets today's
requirements rather than those of a geopolitically outdated situation."' In April 2000, "the UK
Home Secretary, Jack Straw, criticized the Convention as 'too broad for conditions in the 21st
Century."' Id. at 8.

30

See Safe Haven Plans to Slash Aylum Numbers, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 4, 2003,
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2003/feb/05/ asylum.immigrationasylumandrefugees. The
British government proposals can be found in a letter sent by Tony Blair on March 10, 2003 to
the Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, prior to the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of
June 2003, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/blair-simiis- asile.pdf.
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from among those found to be Convention refugees.3 1 Noting that these
problems have not gone away in 2011, journalist Ed West declared the 1951
Refugee Convention "unfit for purpose": "the very concept of asylum,"
he
'
asserted, is "an outdated and unworkable relic from the mid-20th century. 32
Why do Milibank, these Western leaders, and journalists such as Ed West
view the Refugee Convention in this way? One reason concerns how refugees
flee their homes outside of the controlled channels of immigration: "The use by
the boat people of people smugglers to circumvent visa and border controls has
prompted Australia to join other countries in openly questioning the operation
and continuing viability of the Convention itself."33 Millbank goes on to point
out that "asylum systems in Western countries have come under increasing
strain through their use as a migration channel," though this is particularly true
for European countries without traditional avenues of legal immigration.34 At
times, public reaction in certain Western nations to increasing numbers of
refugees and other migrants entering from developing countries has been
particularly negative:
Asylum seekers, along with those who enter via family reunion, have
comprised the bulk of the sizeable immigrant intakes into Western
European countries in recent years. Asylum-driven immigration ranks high
among voter concerns, anti-foreigner sentiment is widespread, and rightwing anti-immigration parties are getting up to 30 per cent of voter
35
support.
Political elites in numerous European nations, including France, Germany,
Italy, the U.K., Sweden, and Finland, have taken hard lines on immigration to
address public concerns.36 In this context, states have actively tried to restrict
3
access to asylum in myriad ways, including by externalizing border controls.

See Alan Travis, Letwin Pledges to Keep Asylum Seekers Out,THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/society/ 2003/oct/08/asylum.politics.
32
Ed West, It's Not the Home Office's Fault-the UN Convention on Refugees Is Not Fitfor Pupose, THE
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 11, 2011), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/ news/edwest/100071316/its-not-thehome-offices- fault-%E2%80%93-the-un-convention-on-refugees-is-not-fit-for-purpose/.
33 Millbank, The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at 3.
31

34

Id.

35

Id. at 5.

Dr. Matthew Goodwin interviewed by National Public Radio host Rachel Martin, Watching
Extremism: Rise of the European Right, NPR, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/04/15/
150667555/watching-extremism-rise-of-the-european-right.
37 See Schoenholtz, Improving Legal Frameworks, supra note 7, at 39-46; Schoenholtz, Refugee
Protection in the United States Post-September 11, supra note 7, at 360-364; see generaly Jane
McAdam & Kate Purcell, Refugee Protection in the Howard Years: Obstructing the Right to Seek Asylum,
27 AUSTRALIAN Y'BOOK OF INT'L LAW 87 (2008); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Right to Seek Aylum:
Interception at Sea and the Princple of Non-Refoulement, 23 INT'L-J. OF REFUGEE LAW 443 (2011).
36

Summer 2015

ChicagoJournalof InternalionalLaw

UNHCR's own magazine featured a cover story on the fiftieth anniversary
of the Refugee Convention entitled "A 'Timeless' Treaty Under Attack."38 The
article stated that in 2001 "the Convention is coming apart at the seams,
according to some of the same capitals which had breathed life into the
protection regime a half century ago." 39 States reported that their asylum systems
are being overwhelmed and are "urging a legal retrenchment," concluding that
the Convention is "outdated, unworkable and irrelevant.''40
Given the shift in developed-state attitudes towards the Refugee
Convention, UNHCR, the international organization responsible for working
with states as they implement this agreement, felt compelled at the end of the
twentieth century to redress the deteriorating quality of asylum and to "revitalise
a too often criticised, disregarded or abused protection framework."'" The
agency understood that "states face considerable challenges as they try and
reconcile their obligations under the Convention with problems raised by the
mixed nature of migratory movements, misuse of the asylum system, increasing
costs, [and] the growth in smuggling and trafficking of people."42 UNHCR
proposed Global Consultations to clarify the scope and content of protection
with the goal of strengthening the implementation of the 1951 Convention "as
the foundation and central refugee protection instrument." The agency heard
the complaint that the refugee treaty regime was outmoded: "We hear with
increasing regularity that the protection regime of which we have been made the
guardian no longer exactly fits the problem."4 4 UNHCR's leadership disagreed
with that state perspective and asserted that "refugee protection is not a static
but a dynamic and action-oriented function. It has and must retain an inherent
capacity for adjustment and development in the face of a changed international
environment."4 Accordingly, one of the goals of the Global Consultations was
to "promote the progressive development of international law for the protection
of refugees." 46
38

Marilyn Achiron, A

limeless' Treaty under Attack, 123 REFUGES 4 (2001), available at

http://www.unhcr.org/3b5e90ea0.html.
39

Id.at 6.

40

Id.at 6-7.

41

U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Revitalizing the Refugee Protection Regime: The RoadAhead as the 1951
Convention Turns 50, Statement by Ms. Erika Feller, Dep't of Int'l Protection, to the 51 st Session of
ExCom, Geneva (Oct. 3, 2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/429d70e72.html.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Note on International Protection, UN Doc.

42

A/AC.96/951, 1 (Sept. 13, 2001).
43

U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 41.

44

Id.

45

Id.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 42.

46
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These UNHCR campaigns for the protection of refugee rights
appropriately aimed to motivate states to behave as they committed themselves
to do when they became signatories to or ratified this treaty and/or its Protocol,
or to comply with international customary law (for those states not yet
signatories). But more than a decade following UNHCR's Global Consultations,
these issues remain.47
IV.

WHY AND HOW THE REFUGEE CONVENTION MATTERS

TODAY: AN EXAMINATION OF NEW AGENTS AND
TARGETS OF PERSECUTION

Despite these direct challenges to their effectiveness and the fact that there
is no international enforcement mechanism, the Refugee Convention and
Protocol are implemented on a daily basis in ways that protect persecuted
refugees, even in states that have tried to limit their treaty obligations. While
implementation is imperfect, many refugees are protected.48 UNHCR reported
that states recognized more than 210,000 asylum-seekers as Convention refugees
in 2012." 9
How are states applying the terms of the Refugee Convention to protect
today's refugees who show up on their shores? Focusing on two significant legal
concepts, I will show that the refugee definition has enabled states to protect
refugees from new kinds of persecution and from both non-state and state
agents of persecution.
47

48

49

In 2013, Millbank opined that the Refugee Convention legitimizes unregulated entry, a growing
number of voters think the treaty is past its "use-by date," and Australians should "rethink
dubious international obligations" and require asylum-seekers to apply for a refugee or
humanitarian visa overseas. Millbank, Ditch the Refugee Convention, supra note 5.
Asylum grant rates in U.S. immigration courts are considerably higher now than they were in the
mid-1990s. See Office of Planning, Analysis, & Technology, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev.,
FY 2013 Statistical Yearbook K1 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
statspub/fy13syb.pdf (showing grants rates over 50 percent in each of fiscal years 2010-2013); FY
2000 Statistical Yearbook 02 (2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/
SYB2000Final.pdf (showing grants rates of 17 percent and 23 percent for fiscal years 1996 and
1997).
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, STATISTICAL Y'BOOK 2012 6 (2013). This number included an
estimated 20,500 individuals whose negative decisions were overturned at the appeal or review
stage, although UNHCR reports the figure is likely to be substantially higher, as a significant
number of decisions rendered by states at the appeal or review stage of the asylum procedure
have not been released. In 2012, the U.S. recognized the largest number of Convention status
refugees (25,300 during the U.S. fiscal year), followed by Germany (17,100), Rwanda (15,100),
Sudan (14,000), Sweden (13,700), Malaysia (13,100), and Turkey (10,900). Id. at 46. In 2013, states
granted 44 percent of asylum seekers Convention refugee status or a complementary form of
protection, a significantly higher value than the 37 percent granted in 2012. U.N. High Comm'r
for Refugees, GLOBAL TRENDS 2013 30 (2014).
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A.

The
Changing
of Persecution

Nature

of

the

State

and

Agents

As Andrew Shacknove observed almost three decades ago, the absence of
state protection is the basis of refugeehood:
In exchange for their allegiance, citizens can minimally expect that their
government will guarantee physical security, vital subsistence, and liberty of
political participation and physical movement. No reasonable person would
be satisfied with less. Beneath this threshold the social compact has no
50
meaning.
There is a long history of states not living up to this understanding of the
social compact, and in that regard, many states today do not protect all their
citizens well. In some instances, they are simply not willing to do so-the state
itself may persecute individuals or condone persecution carried out by non-state
actors. In other situations, states are willing but unable to protect all citizens.
The nature of the state has changed since 1951, resulting in governments
with varying degrees of authority and territorial control. The UN consisted of
fifty-one countries at its founding in 1945. Thirteen of these states participated
in the Ad Hoc Committee on Stateless and Related Problems, as formed in 1949
by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to prepare and revise draft
agreements on the legal status of stateless persons."' Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 429(V) of December 14, 1950, UNHCR convened the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries, comprised of twenty-six State participants and
2
two State observers, to prepare what became the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Political scientists and international relations experts report that most
governments in 1951 asserted authority throughout their territory, whether they
were by nature authoritarian or democratic.5 3 In contrast, these experts observe a
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Shacknove, supra note 1, at 281.
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Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany,
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Introductoy Note by the Office of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees 6 (Jan. 31, 1967),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf.
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range of capabilities among today's 193 members of the U.N. with respect to
how well states protect their populations.5 4
While the model of state sovereigns effectively controlling their territories
originated in seventeenth-century Western Europe, that model reached its
"apex" by the middle of the twentieth century when "effective sovereignty"
meant that governments not only effectively policed their own societies, but also
provided public goods and services.55 "Ungoverned spaces" where state control
is absent, weak, or contested emerged particularly after the end of the Cold
War. 6 Non-state actors, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, FARC in Colombia, and
Mara Salvatrucha in El Salvador, have "provided state-like functions for
57
extended periods of time" in recent years.
The very concepts of "failing," "weak," or "fragile" states are relatively
new.58 The United States National Security Strategy of 2002 as well as the
European Union 2003 Security Strategy named failing or fragile states as major
threats to security.59 The Fund For Peace and Foreign Policy started publishing the
FragileStates Index (formerly the FailedStates Index) in 2005.60 Based on twelve key
political, social, and economic indicators, the Index classifies states into
categories that evidence degrees of fragility and concern. 61 The 2014 Index
classifies thirty-four states as either Very High Alert, High Alert, or Alert; thirtytwo states as Very High Warning; forty-three states as High Warning; seventeen
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See, for exampk, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, The Worldwide Governance
Indicators (The World Bank Dev. Research Group Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430
2010); see generally Fredrik Soderbaum, Modes of Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, Sovereigny
Boosting, and Shadow Networks, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 419 (2004); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ReConceiving Third World' Legitimate Governance Struggles in Our Time: Emergent Imperatives for Rights
Activism, 6 BUFF. HuM. RTS. L. RFV. 1 (2000); Elke Krahmann, National, Regional, and Global
Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?, 9 GI.OBAL GOVERNANCE 323 (2003); Tanja A. Borzel &
Thomas Risse, Governance Without a State: Can It Work?, 4 REGUI.ATION & GOVERNANCE 113
(2010); Magdalena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg & Anders Uhlin, Democragy in Global Governance: The
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Shearing, supra note 53.
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AUTHORITY IN AN ERA OF SOFTENED SOVEREIGNTY 17, 18, 20 (Anne L. Clunan & Harold A.
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Id. at 17.
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states as Warning; and twelve states as Less Stable.62 Only forty states are
classified as Stable, Very Stable, Sustainable, or Very Sustainable.63 This is a very
different world than that of the West-dominated U.N. of the post-Second World
War period when states created the Refugee Convention.
States that do not or cannot adequately protect their populations pose
potential threats to their neighbors. In the extreme, a state may be violently
challenged by an internal armed force, and such conflicts can spill over to other
states, as occurred in West Africa in the 1990s and 2000s. Less traditional
challenges to state authority over territory occur when gangs or organized crime
groups control significant geographical areas. The majority of refugees in today's
world have fled conflict and other serious violence.64
To stabilize a region and protect their own interests, strong states today
may attempt to address such problems. In 2012, for example, U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton created the newest bureau at the State Department, the
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), to advance "U.S.
national security by breaking cycles of violent conflict and mitigating crises in
priority countries." CSO engages in "conflict prevention, crisis response and
stabilization, aiming to address the underlying causes of destabilizing violence."6 6
Particularly telling is how the foreign affairs agency of the U.S. government
explains why weak states are a "central security challenge."6 The State
Department is concerned about the destabilizing effects of states unable to
control their territories and protect their citizens with respect to increased risk of
"weapons proliferation, organized crime, and activity by violent extremists."68 In
the post-Cold War world, national security involves strengthening civilian
9
security.
Even more revealing is the State Department's high prioritization of
Honduras in its first year of operations.7 " The U.S. government focuses
principally on states experiencing traditional civil conflict or political violence-
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Id. at 4-5.
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Id.
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See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2012, supranote 16, at 2.
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BUREAU OF CONFICT & STABILIZATION OPERATIONS, http://www.state.gov/j/cso (last visited
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Syria, Kenya, and Burma.7" Honduras, in contrast, matters to the State
Department because its homicide levels are the highest in the world outside of
war zones. CSO focuses on reforming the police and the prosecutor's office
there, as well as "supporting a non-governmental coalition to enable citizens to
72
help stem violence in their communities and advocate public security reform."
Criminal violence is the issue-not political rebellion:
In recent years, Central America has become the most violent region in the
world. Honduras leads this deadly trend with the world's highest murder
rate of 86 per 100,000 in 2011. Increasing criminal violence and high levels
of impunity have become so pervasive that citizens increasingly feel
powerless to alter the grip of gangs, transnational criminal organizations,
and corrupt officials. This corrosive combination of spreading violence and
an increasingly resigned public threaten the security and prosperity of
Honduras, potentially exacerbating trends of illegal immigration, trafficking
in all forms of illicit contraband, and gang activities that reach into the
U.S.

73

Then the real shocker comes. Belize has a serious gang problem:
Most Americans hear "Belize" and imagine sandy beaches and unspoiled
rainforests. But Belize also has one of the world's highest homicide rates,
due mostly to gang violence. A gang truce took effect in 2011, but it was
fragile, and by January 2012 there was concern that the homicide rate would
74
start to climb again.

The language of diplomats who work in conflict zones-a truce-is used
the serious
to describe relations among gangs, thus implicitly recognizing
75
groups.
armed
non-traditional
these
by
security threat posed
The U.S. government is appropriately concerned that nearby sovereigns are
unable to protect their citizens from a variety of non-traditional, non-state
actors. These powerful groups exercise authority through violence in many
different parts of the world. Some groups control particular territories of the
state. Corruption and violence enable organized criminal groups, such as drug
cartels, to dominate over populations in certain areas.
To get a better picture of states that cannot protect their populations from
these non-state actors, this Article closely examines certain Central American

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

BUREAU

OF

CONFLICT &

STABILIZATION

OPERATIONS:

http://www.state.gov/j/cso/where/engagements/honduras/
2015).

WHERE

WE

WORK:

HONDURAS,

index.htm (last visited Apr. 19,

74

Laura Till & Julie Walton, Defusing Gang Problems in BeliZe,
DIPNOTE (May 4, 2013),
http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2013/05/04/defusing-gang-problems-belize.

75

See id.

Summer 2015

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

countries, along with Mexico, that have emerged as particularly dangerous.7 6
Different non-state actors operate in this region: street gangs, sophisticated
criminal groups, and transnational criminal organizations rule particular
territories. Demobilized military, paramilitary, and intelligence groups serve as
the armed forces for the sophisticated cartels.77 While a significant portion of
organized crime involves trafficking in people and arms, the movement of illegal
drugs to the U.S. has led to violent struggles for the "strategic control of
territories the length and breadth of the Central American land route between
Colombia and Mexico." 7 This involves territorial control of certain urban and
rural areas needed for the cross-border movement of drugs, arms, and trafficked
persons."
In the Mexican criminal world, controlling a plaza means collecting what is
essentially a toll, or tax, on any activity undertaken by the multiple criminal
groups operating in that territory. The so-called piso supplies a significant
revenue stream, as the command group takes upwards of half of the value
of the contraband moving through its corridor, whether weapons or
humans or drugs.80
The cartels have created miniature armies in the battle for territorial control.8 1
Gangs working with drug cartels facilitate these movements by exercising
control over communities of interest. For example, the transnational gang Mara
Salvatrucha extorts small business owners and kills or threatens with death those
who don't pay the "renta" or "war tax." In this way, the gang obtains the
resources to secure control over their territory.82 Organized crime groups such
as gangs use extortion, "death threats, rapes, killings, torture, forced recruitment
of youth, boys and girls, and kidnapping" to assert authority in their
communities. 83 They reign with impunity, whether due to ineffective law
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enforcement or corrupt officials.84 Thousands of law enforcement, prosecutorial,
judicial, and elected officials collude with gangs.85 At times, organized crime
directly infiltrates the offices of the Public Prosecutors of Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras.86 Those responsible for the rule of law, such as judges,
prosecutors, and mayors, are at times threatened or killed to disable the
enforcement of the criminal laws. Victim and witness protection programs are
limited to a few people, and many do not denounce the perpetrators out of
fear.87 Reportedly, contacting police is not only futile, but dangerous, as it risks
further violence from the gangs in retaliation.88
Some 70,000 to 300,000 belong to MS-13 and 18th Street gangs and
affiliates (clicas) in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.8 9 One analyst
identifies two major forms: youth and adult gangs. Youth gangs rob, extort, and
deal drugs on the street, while more highly-organized adult gangs are also active
9°
in international trafficking of narcotics, arms, stolen vehicles, and persons.
These adult gangs tend to be connected to drug cartels and corrupt public
officials. For all practical purposes, there is no police presence in many gangcontrolled areas.
Drug cartels and gangs in this region have adopted the same methods used
during decades of civil conflict to terrorize politicians and the public so that they
can operate as they see fit. "The strategic use of random violence, kidnapping,
torture and murder are employed as part of a coordinated effort to terrorize and
co-opt police, bureaucrats, prosecutors, judges and elected officials in order to
shape a socio-political environment within which they are free to operate with
impunity."9 1 U.S. military analysts characterize this as "asymmetrical warfare" or
"insurgency" used to establish political control and domination.9" Motives differ
from traditional insurgents, but objectives are the same: "to impose their power
and undermine the operational capacity and authority of legitimate state
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actors."93 These gangs act as de facto authorities not to perform civic functions,
as some guerilla organizations did, but to undermine states' "capacit[ies] to fulfill
basic functions of governance to the point of making legitimate institutions
largely irrelevant." 94
The gangs are not monolithic even in the so-called Northern Triangle of
Central America. The Los Zetas cartel in Guatemala, for example, works
through local criminal "franchises." 9 In El Salvador, the maras charge a levy
from a large part of the population and enforce their rule through lynching and
other types of killings. This violence is used also to intimidate those who
denounce the gangs to the Public Prosecutor. Reportedly, these intimidation
strategies have resulted in increased withdrawal of such denunciations. In
addition, the maras rely heavily on forced recruitment of young people.96 In
Honduras, the organized gangs control significant areas of the country. The
gangs tend to operate in the cities, while the drug cartels reign in many rural
areas. 97
Gangs have been and continue to be a worldwide phenomenon. Jamaica,
Brazil, the Russian Federation, Nigeria, Iraq, Kenya, many Eastern European
countries, and, of course, the U.S. are among the nations that have significant
gang activity today. 98 In discussing the challenge posed by such groups to weak
' 99
states, analysts talk about "criminal conflicts" and "criminal insurgency."
According to a Wilson Center expert, "[t]he spread of transnational organized
crime-fed by drug-trafficking and by a growing number of other illegal
economies-is the most significant security challenge for Latin American and
Caribbean countries today." 100
These criminal organizations take on state functions and purposes. Drug
cartel violence, for example, has a political goal: to accumulate capital and secure
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economic dominion.'O In essence, cartels have morphed into an alternative
society and economy. They don't just tax the population; they "steal from or
control utilities such as gasoline, sell their own products and are the ultimate
decision-makers in the territories they control."" 2
Given how they assert territorial control, it is no surprise that drug cartel
violence results in high rates of displacement. An Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre study examined displacement from states that accounted for
38 percent of Mexico's population but 68 percent of its homicides. 10 3 In over
one hundred municipalities with the highest levels of violence, the rate of
displacement was fifteen times higher than in municipalities without high levels
of violence. Controlling for other drivers of migration, including economic,
demographic and urbanization ones, the study found that 4.5 times as many
people fled violent municipalities than non-violent ones. Drug-cartel related
violence has displaced an estimated 220,000 Mexicans in Ciudad Juarez and its
surroundings alone. 04 More than one-quarter of the population of certain
Mexican cities fled drug violence.' One study found that fifty-five percent of
10 6
Juarez would move out of the city for security reasons if possible.
When states cannot provide protection from groups such as drug cartels
and gangs, some of the affected population cross borders to find safety. That is
when the Refugee Convention comes into play for those targeted by non-state
actors in connection with a protected characteristic.
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B.

The
New
Agents
Refugee Convention
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Given the nature of nation-states in 1951, human rights treaties focused
particularly on a sovereign's behavior towards all persons geographically within
its authority. In the "European totalitarian experience, . . . refugees were
primarily the persecuted victims of highly organized predatory states."'0 7
Unfortunately, repressive governments continue to dominate their citizenry
more than sixty years later. In 2012, Freedom House classified nine governments
as the world's worst human rights violators, very closely followed by seven
others." 8 The 2014 Maplecroft Human Rights Risk Index classified thirty-four
countries as "extreme risk," an increase of 70 percent since 2008.109 But today's
states include as well many that are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens
from non-state actors. How have states applied the Refugee Convention
definition to these changing circumstances?
The definition itself declares that a refugee is a person who "owing to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country.'
As to the identity of the
persecutor, the definition is silent. Not surprisingly, this silence produced some
debate among adjudicators regarding non-state actors as persecutors.
Most states interpreting the Refugee Convention readily protected those
who fled persecution from both state and non-state actors."' UNHCR's
107
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longstanding interpretive guidance on the Refugee Convention observes that
persecution can emanate from state as well as non-state agents, including the
local populace, when tolerated by the authorities or where the authorities refuse,
or are unable, to provide protection.12 Only four European governments
determined initially that under certain circumstances, the Refugee Convention
did not protect individuals from persecution by non-state actors.
The jurisprudence in Germany, Switzerland, and, to some degree, that of
France and Italy, differentiated among four different non-state actor situations.
First, where the state instigated, condoned, or tolerated persecution, these four
nations agreed with the prevailing interpretation "that persons fleeing such
persecution are refugees because the State is unwilling to protect such
victims."'1 3 Second, where non-state agents of persecution control all or part of
the country such that they act as de facto authorities, all four agreed in principle
that persons fleeing persecution carried out by these actors come within the
meaning of the Convention definition. Professor Kalin observes that states have
different approaches to determine the necessary conditions for a group to
become a de facto authority."' The main area of disagreement with the majority
of governmental authorities concerns situations where the State is willing but
unable to provide protection. For years, Germany, Switzerland, and France
denied asylum to such forced migrants. Finally, while most states recognize as
refugees those fleeing persecution where no authority exists that could protect
them and other victims of persecution, these four states viewed the inability to
protect in the same light as when the country of origin was willing but unable to
protect. 1 5
As Kalin points out, the text does not support the interpretation that only
state agents of persecution can create Convention refugees: "The wording of the
1951 Convention does not require any direct responsibility of the State."" 6 As
UNHCR's current Director of International Protection explained about a decade
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ago, the refugee definition focuses on the act of persecution rather than the
identity of the persecutor. That should not be surprising, given that the purpose
of the Convention is to protect people from serious harm.' 17
How has this issue evolved during the last decade or so? The High Court
of Australia articulated its understanding of the non-state agent issue in a 2002
case involving domestic abuse. The High Court explained that "[i]t is accepted in
Australia, and it is widely accepted in other jurisdictions, that the serious harm
involved in persecution may be inflicted by persons who are not agents of the
government.""' 8 It recognized that where the persecutor is a person or group of
people, "the failure of the state to intervene to protect the victim" may be
relevant to the victim's fear of persecution-"whether the failure resulted from a
state policy of tolerance or condonation of the persecution, or whether it
resulted from inability to do anything about it.""' 9 The asylum seeker claimed
that the persecution resulted from "systematic discrimination against women,
involving selective enforcement of the law, which amounts to a failure of the
state of Pakistan to discharge its responsibilities to protect women."' 2 ° The High
Court described this case to be one of alleged tolerance and condoning and cited
to Lord Hoffman's opinion in Ex Parte Shah, where he classified the failure of
the Nazi authorities to protect a Jewish shopkeeper set upon with impunity by
business rivals as an element of persecution based upon race.121
Recognizing non-state actors conceptually as persecutors, of course, is the
first important step adjudicators took. Equally meaningful is determining when
individuals do not have access to state protection from persecution by a nonstate actor. In 2004, the European Council explained how to understand the
State's responsibility to protect in real terms. Article 7(2) of the European
Council 2004 Qualification Directive provides that:
protection is generally provided when the actors [both state and non-state
controlling territory] take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or
suffering of serious harm, interalia, by operating an effective legal system for
the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution
or serious harm, and the applicant has access to such protection. 122
In essence, this establishes the rule of law as the measure of the state's actual
protection.
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As courts analyze cases where the alleged persecutor is an individual or
group of people, they continue to develop this rule-of-law measure. In assessing
the adequacy of state protection for victims of domestic violence, the Canadian
Federal Court considered critical factors to be access to restraining orders and
the training of law enforcement units to facilitate effective implementation of
legislation. The record in that case included evidence that the 2009 Hungarian
law making restraining orders available was not effective; law enforcement units
did not receive special training to facilitate implementation; Hungarian courts
issued restraining orders in only twelve percent of reported domestic violence
cases in 2010; and no data existed concerning breaches of these orders. As such,
the court held that the Immigration and Refugee Board's conclusion that
applicants could have found meaningful state protection through the 1 state
23
legislation was not well founded and remanded the case for reconsideration.
This Canadian court also analyzed the circumstances under which asylum
claimants are obliged affirmatively to seek police or state protection. In general,
claimants must seek state protection unless the state is "unwilling or unable" to
protect them.12 4 In this case, the applicants did not seek such protection. The
court held that a totality-of-the-evidence test determines whether an applicant
should have sought state protection.12' The court focused on evidence in this
case of police corruption and abuse against Roma women and of such women
experiencing a high incidence of domestic violence. Evidence did not show that
government actions actually improved the situation. A study showed that Roma
women reported domestic violence less often than non-Roma and lacked trust in
law enforcement officials because of police antagonism and failure to provide
adequate protection in the past. Accordingly, the Court held that the Board's
conclusion that the applicant "should have sought protection cannot be
reasonable, in this particular case, when the totality of the evidence demonstrates
' 126
that state protection would not have been reasonably forthcoming."
Finally, one fascinating development with respect to persecution by nonstate actors concerns the issue of the persecutor's mens rea. By their actions,
most persecutors intend to harm their victims, but adjudicators have found
throughout the last two decades that persecution can proceed without such
malice. A leading U.S. case authored by the Chairman of the Board of
Immigration Appeals in an en banc decision held that female genital mutilation
can be the basis for asylum and, as practiced by a particular tribe in Togo,

123 SeeJudit Sebok v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2012] F.C. 1107, 1 25 (Can.).
124

Id. 23 (citing Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 723-24).

125 Id. 25. The court closely examines the facts on record to reach this conclusion. See id. 1 22, 24.
126

Id. 25.
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constituted persecution. 2 ' "[S]ubjective 'punitive' or 'malignant' intent is not
' 128
required for harm to constitute persecution."
In Chen Shi Hai, the High Court of Australia held similarly that
"[p]ersecution can proceed from reasons other than 'enmity' and 'malignity."' 12 9
The applicant was a three-and-a-half year old "black child," the offspring of an
unauthorized Chinese marriage where the parents had already had more than
one child. (This third child was born while the parents awaited removal to China
from Australia.) The Refugee Review Tribunal had determined that this child
would be denied access to food, education, and health care beyond a very basic
level and would probably confront discrimination such that he faced a real
chance of persecution. But the Tribunal found that the persecution would not
be for reasons of his membership in a particular social group, because the
consequences he would likely suffer in China would not "result from any
malignity, enmity or other averse intention towards him on the part of the
authorities." 3 ' In the Tribunal's view, it would result from their intention "to
penalize those who have children outside the approved guidelines. ' 13' In
contrast, the High Court held that the state targeted the applicant because he
was a "black child," observing that "from the perspective of those responsible
for discriminatory treatment, [persecution] may result from the highest of
'
motives, including an intention to benefit those who are its victims. 132
The 2004 EU Qualification Directive on Minimum Protection Standards
included a directive on non-state agents of persecution, broadening protection
for refugees in some countries. 133 Article 6(c) listed non-state actors as agents of
persecution or serious harm, if it could be demonstrated that the government or
parties/organizations controlling it or a substantial part of its territory, including
international organizations, is unable or unwilling to provide protection against
persecution or serious harm.134 Inclusion of non-state agents of persecution
broadened the refugee definition in Germany, France, and Italy, all of which
transposed Article 6 literally into their refugee and asylum laws. 13' Before 2003,
127

See In re.Fau4ya Kasinga,21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A.1996).

128

Id.at 365.

129

Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293,

35

(Aust.).
130 Id. 7.
131

Id.

132

Id. 35.

133 See Council Directive 2004/83, supra note 122.
134

See id.
art. 6(c).

135

See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, The Impact of the EU Quaification Directive on
InternationalProtection 15 (2008), available at http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-
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the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons
(OFPRA)rarely granted asylum status to individuals who suffered persecution at
the hands of non-state actors, but the concept of non-state agents of persecution
is now part of French law. 36 France interprets Article 6 of the Qualification
Directive as allowing for persecution by non-state actors where the state or its
authorities "refuse or are unable to provide protection."1 37 In practice, France
has recognized the following actors: armed rebel groups such as Islamic groups
in Algeria, warlords in Afghanistan, chimeres and RAMICOS 138 in Haiti, armed
groups in Iraq, revolutionary armed forces in Colombia, rebels in Somalia, and
Kurd combatants; family members; and members of the local community, such
as in cases regarding FGM, forced marriage, clans, tribes, mafias, and bandits.' 3 9
Italy has applied the non-state actor principle in situations such as Somalia,
where the state is incapable of providing protection because government
authorities effectively do not exist, and translated the provision concerning nonstate actors directly from the Directive. 4 ' For example, during civil wars, militias
that control parts of a state have been considered non-state agents of
persecution. 141

Germany incorporated into Section 60(1) of its 2004 Immigration Act the
exact definition of non-state actors of persecution that appears in the

136

in-europe/150.html. Germany transposed most of the Directive in Law on the Transposition of
EU Directives on Immigration and Asylum 2007, and specifically transposed Article 6 in the
Immigration Act of 2004. Id.at 34. Italy incorporated the Qualification Directive in its legislative
decree on transposition of Directive 2004/83 on January 1, 2008. Id.at 34.
See Loi 2003-1176 du 10 decembre 2003 modifant laloi 52-893 du 25 juillet 1952 relative au droit

137

d'asile [Law 2003-1176 of 10 December 2003], amending Act No. 25-893 adopted on 25 July
1952, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORl
XTOOOO00
611789&dateTexte=&categorieLen=id; Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for
Human Rights, on the Effective Respect for Human Rights in France (Strasbourg: Council of
Europe, 2006),
205, available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=965765&Site=
CommDH&BackColorlnternet=FEC65B&BackColorlntranet=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FF
C679.
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 135, at 84.

138 Chimeres were supporters of Haitian President Aristide who used violent means to silence those
opposed to the President. See Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Haiti: The
Chim~res, Their Acivities and Their Geographic Presence;the Treatment of the Chimeres 6) the Autborities and
the Presence of Group Members within the Government and the Police (2006-Ma 2008), (June 3, 2008),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a70409420.html. RAMICOS (the Assembly of
Militants for the Commune of St. Marc) also opposed the Aristide government. See U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Haiti Report 2004 (2005)
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41764.htm.
139 See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 135, at 86.
140 See id.at 84.
See id.at 87.

141
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Qualification Directive.'42 The Federal Office guidelines include private persons
such as family members as valid agents of persecution.' The Federal Office has
also accepted the following non-state agents of persecution: clans, criminals,
mafia, bandits, paramilitaries, religious extremists, and terrorists.144 Some courts
ruled that only those agents who possess levels of power and organization
comparable to a state's will qualify as non-state agents of persecution, but the
higher Federal Administrative Court decided that no such particular
requirements will apply in order to qualify a person or group as a non-state
actor.' Nor do such particular requirements apply in the case law to situations
in which the applicant's country of origin possesses no functioning state
46
authority. 1
The concept of a non-state agent of persecution thus has developed over
time. From the beginning, most states applied the 1951 Convention to cases
involving such persecutors. Germany, Switzerland, and to some degree France
and Italy were outliers for some time, but have since aligned their positions on
non-state agents of persecution with the majority of other states. The non-state
persecutor has raised important issues regarding the state's willingness and
ability to protect citizens from serious harms. In conformance with the purpose
of the Refugee Convention, adjudicators have applied the terms of the refugee
definition to new agents of persecution as the nature of the state has changed. 47
Have they also found the definition capable of addressing new types of
persecution?

142

See id. at 84.

143

See id. at 84, 86-87.

144

See id. at 87.

145

146

See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] July 18, 2008, BVerwGE
1 C 15.05 (Get.); European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 135, at 87.
See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 135, at 87; see also

147

Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Apr. 27, 2010, BVerwGE 10
C 4.09 (Ger.).
At the global level, one related development that may have contributed to a shift in this debate
followed adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. This global
agreement defines persecution of an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, or gender grounds as a crime against humanity, capable of commission by both
state and non-state agents. Germany, Switzerland, France, and Italy each signed on to this treaty
in the year it was created. STATE PARTIES TO THE ICC, http://www.icccpi.int/en menus/asp/states% 2 0parties/Pages/the%20states%/o20parties/o20to%20the%20rome
%20statute.aspx.
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The New Targets of Persecution under
Convention: Particular Social Groups Today

Schoenholt.Z
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Refugee

Given the significant ways in which the state and agents of persecution
have changed since 1951, it should come as no surprise that refugees have fled
new forms of persecution. One of the five grounds established by the
Convention definition, membership in a particular social group, has played a key
role in protecting refugees in the context of the changing nature of persecution.
What did this ground mean in 1951, and what does it mean today?
In the first part of the twentieth century before the Second World War, the
international community approached refugee flight as group movement. At the
request of the League of Nations, the first High Commissioner for Refugees
focused his efforts on assisting over one million Russians who fled civil war and
famine. The League quickly expanded High Commissioner Nansen's mandate as
the Graeco-Turkish War created over two million refugees. The new groups
included Greeks, Turks, Armenians, and Bulgarians.148
This group-based, ad hoc approach to international displacement shifted
when the Allied Powers focused on the forty million displaced persons at the
end of the Second World War.' 49 Most repatriated after the war, some
unwillingly, including Ukrainians and those from the Baltic States. When
significant numbers of Eastern Europeans resisted repatriation, causing a major
diplomatic confrontation in the fledgling UN Security Council, the U.S. led an
effort to end these returns and establish an agency mandated to find a durable
solution other than repatriation for these refugees. In establishing the
International Refugee Organization (IRO) in July 1947, the UN General
Assembly declared that no refugees with "valid objections" shall be returned to
their country of origin.'5 °
Which objections were valid? To answer this question, the General
Assembly created the IRO Constitution and the first modern refugee
definition-an individual rather than group-based concept. Valid objections
related to fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, and political
opinion, derived from the Nazi experience and applicable to the Soviet one. The
human rights of individual refugees-reflecting the fundamental dignity of each
person-were born.
The IRO refugee definition is very similar to the Refugee Convention
definition, created only four years later. The Refugee Convention negotiators
148

See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, State of the World's Refugees-2000: Fifty Years of

149

Humanitarian Action 15 (2000).
See id. at 13.

150

Id. at 16.
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added a fifth ground, membership in a particular social group,1 ' proposed by
the Swedish delegate."5 2 The travauxpreparatoiresonly briefly mention this ground
and give no information as to what the Swedish delegate or the other negotiators
had in mind by this term. In introducing it at the 19th Meeting, the Swedish
delegate simply said: "Such cases existed, and it would be as well to mention
them explicitly."'5 3 This was not at all controversial. In fact, the delegates
adopted this ground by unanimous consent without discussion at the 23rd
Meeting.'
Because so much jurisprudence during the last quarter of a century has
focused on the types and targets of persecution, it may come as quite a surprise
to many that the negotiators did not even discuss this aspect of the definition.
As Aleinikoff points out, the delegates seriously debated other aspects of the
refugee definition, perhaps more than any other topic. They focused on issues
such as the geographical and temporal limitations of the definition. But there is
"virtually no discussion" of the kinds of persecution.' Aleiikoff concludes:
My best reading of the travaux is that the Convention was written with the
intent of protecting all persons (and groups) then existing in Europe who
had been or were likely to be the victims of persecution. No forms of
persecution were intentionally excluded (although various other exclusions
were written into the Convention).156
The concept of particular social group (PSG) may have referred to groups
such as gay people persecuted by the Nazis and the wealthy class targeted by the
Soviets.5 7 Almost fifty years ago, the first major treatise writer on international
refugee law, Professor Grahl-Madsen, observed that "[n]obiity, capitalists,
landowners, civil servants, businessmen, professional people, farmers, workers,
members of a linguistic or other minority, even members of certain associations,
' 58
clubs, or societies, all constitute social groups of various kinds."'

152

Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summay Record
of the Nineteenth Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.19 (1951), available at http://
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cda4.html.
See id.

153

Id.

154

See Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summagy
Record of the Twen -Third Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.23 (1951), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cda10.html.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of Persecution in U.S. Aylum law, in REFUGEE POICY:
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 292, 297 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991).

151

155

156

Id.

157

See THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL: A
COMIENTARY 62-64 (A. ZimmermannJ. Dorschner & F. Machts eds., 2011).

158

ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME 1

219

(1966).
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Developed increasingly since the 1980s, PSG especially reflects the
changing nature of persecution and its agency. Today states apply this ground to
a range of groups in need of protection, where the government is unable or
unwilling to meet its responsibilities to its citizens. Such groups include those
defined by gender, sexual orientation, procreation, age, family, and
59
socioeconomic status.'
Indeed, gender-related asylum law has developed considerably over time.
In 1985, the Executive Committee of UNHCR, which is constituted by
governments, observed that "[s]tates, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free
to adopt the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or
inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the
society in which they live may be considered as a 'particular social group."'1 60 In
1999, the U.K. House of Lords granted the claims of two married Pakistani
women who were subjected to serious physical abuse by their husbands in Islam
and Shah, defining the social group as "Pakistani women" and acknowledging
the applicants' counsel's argument concerning the dangers that await Pakistani
women who transgress social mores.'61 Today, states grant asylum to women
and girls who transgress or object to prevailing social mores of their societies.' 62

159 See Ram v. MIEA (1995) 57 FCR 565, 568 (Austl.) (describing class-based executions during the
French Revolution and during Pol Pot's rule in Cambodia as "textbook examples" of persecution
for membership in a particular social group); SZLAN v. MIAC (2008) 171 FCR 145, [701 (Austl.)
(commenting that a Maoist "policy of targeting suitably wealthy victims [for extortion] would tend
to support a finding that 'wealthy Nepalis' were a relevant particular social group that needed to
be considered"); MA6-03043 [20091 CanLI 47104, [18] (Can. I.R.B.) (recognizing that "poor
Haitian women with HIV/AIDS" can constitute a PSG); MAO-06253 [2001] CanLI1 26873, 2
(Can. I.R.B.) (finding that "in a country where major landholders, with impunity and the use of
violence, still oppose agrarian reforms designed to provide poor and disadvantaged peasants with
a minimum of dignity and chance for survival, membership in such an agricultural cooperative is a
sacred and essential right which no one should be compelled to waive"). In Bastanipourv. INS, 980
F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992), Judge Posner thought that the kulaks (affluent Russian peasants)
who had been persecuted by Stalin were the sort of group intended to be covered by the term
"particular social group," dted in A v Ministerfor Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225,
265-66 (Austl.).
160 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Executive Committee Conclusions: Refugee Women and International
Protection, No. 39 (1985), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c43a8.htrml.
161 See R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
[1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.), available at http://www.refworld.org/
docid/3dec8abe4.html.
162 See, for example, Asylgerichtshof [AsylGI-I] [Asylum Court] Dec. 6, 2012, docket No. C16 4274651/2012 (Austria) (deciding that an Afghan girl raised in a traditional Afghan-oriented parental
home and thus prevented from exercising her fundamental human rights, is a member of a
particular social group and eligible for refugee status); Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VG]
[Administrative Court] Jan. 18, 2011, A 6 K 615/10 (Ger.) (stating that "unmarried woman with a
'Western' lifestyle" in Iraq would be at risk of gender-based persecution).
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For some two decades now, courts and other adjudicators in Europe and
North America have recognized many different types of gender-specific
persecution and gender-related grounds of persecution,"' including women
subjected to forced marriage,164 single Muslim mothers of illegitimate children,' 65
Iranian women or divorced women in Iran,"' women in El Salvador,' 67 honor
170 domestic
killings,' 68 dowry-related deaths,169 female genital mutilation (FGM),
72 and trafficking. 73
sterilization,'
or
violence,' forced abortion
163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

171

See generally A. Zimmermann, J. Dorschner & F. Machts eds., supra note 157; Canada (Att'y Gen.)
v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
Verwaltungsgericht Oldenburg [VG] [Administrative Court] Apr. 13, 2011, 3 A 2966/09 (Ger.);
S.A.N., Mar. 23, 2011 (No. 1423/2011) (Spain) (Nigerian woman forced to marry tribal chief in
connection with her father's debt).
Rada do Spraw Uchodkc6w [RdU] [Council for Refugees] Aug. 23, 2012, No. RdU-82/8/S/10
(Pol.) (single Russian mother from radical Muslim family).
SDAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v. SBBK (2003) 199 ALR 43 (Austl.) (finding
error in lower court's refusal to recognize Iranian woman who desired to live apart from her
husband and obtain a divorce as well as divorced women in Iran as members of particular social
groups); see also Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 (1996) (N.Z.) (finding that the "particular social
group" limb of the Convention is particularly relevant to a woman's asylum claim based on the
male domination of women in Iranian society at large).
Decision by Immigration Judge Amy C. Hoogasian, San Francisco Immigration Court, Nov. 7,
2012 (on file with author; non-binding) (this case involved a women targeted by a gang member).
Migrations6verdomstolen [MIG] [Migration Court of Appeal] 2011-03-09 UM 3363-10 & 336710 (Swed.); Nejvygi sprivni soudu ze dne 18-05-2011 [Decision of the Supreme Administrative
Court of May 18, 2011], 5 Azs 6/2011-49 (Czech); Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VG]
[Administrative Court] Sept. 8, 2008, A 10 K 13/07 (Ger.).
CRDD U96-03318, June 9, 1997 (Can.) (Indian woman whose in-laws target her because of their
dissatisfaction with dowry).
See In re Kasinga, supra note 127 (granting asylum to woman who fled Togo to avoid a polygamous
forced marriage and feared subjection to FGM upon her return); Matter of A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec.
617, 621 (A.G. 2008) (interpreting asylum law's nexus requirement by concluding that a victim of
FGM cannot have her social-group claim rebutted merely on the grounds that she cannot be
subjected to the procedure again, but that the government must demonstrate that the applicant is
no longer at risk on account of her membership within the particular social group); Mohammed v.
GonZales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that applicant was part of a persecuted social
group and eligible for asylum as a Somali female, and noting "the possession of the immutable
trait of being female is a motivating factor-if not a but-for cause of the persecution [of FGM]");
Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that applicant suffered from FGM on
account of being a member of the social group of Somali females).
S.A.N., Jan. 13, 2009 (No. 1528/2009) (Spain) (gender-based persecution is included in the
Convention ground "membership of a particular social group" because both "sex" and "women"
can be considered social groups; sexually violent acts, domestic and family violence, that cause
deep physical and mental harm constitute grounds upon which persecution can be claimed); Ex
Parte Shah, supra note 161 (holding that "women in Pakistan" are a particular social group, and
granting refugee status to two Pakistani women because, by virtue of the fact that they were
female, their husbands suspected them of adultery and the State would not protect them);
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Starting in the 1990s, UNHCR and various governments promulgated their
own guidelines for gender-related violence and asylum claims.174 The use of rape
in the Bosnian civil war, which received significant media attention, affected
adjudicators' understanding of this sexual violence as a form of persecution.
17
International jurists declared rape a war crime for the first time. 5
Domestic violence as a form of persecution has been a particularly
challenging issue in terms of the nexus to a PSG. An applicant may be abused by
a spouse or a relative for various reasons, but if she can show that her likely
subjection to further abuse without state protection is by reason of membership
in a PSG, such as "women in Pakistan," then she may be eligible for asylum
protection. Questions of systematic discrimination against women involving

172

Supplemental Brief for Dep't of Homeland Sec. at 4-5, Matter of [L-R-, redacted] (B.I.A. Apr. 13,
2009), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter-ofLR DHS-Brief 4_
132009.pdf [hereinafter D14S BrieA ("Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable
to leave" and "Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their position in a
domestic relationship" would meet the requirements for a particular social group).
Re VCT, [2000] C.R.D.D., VAO-00592 (Can.) (Chinese woman arrested and forced to have an

173

abortion protected as member of particular social group of women in China who have one child
and are faced with forced sterilization); Verwaltungericht Trier [VG] [Administrative Court Trier]
Mar. 23, 2011, 5 K 1181/10.TR (Ger.) (granting refugee status to Chinese mother of two
children, connecting fear of forced sterilization to "membership of the particular social group of
women"); A v Ministerfor Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, supra note 159 (upholding Tribunal's order
granting refugee status to Chinese "parents in the reproductive age group").
C.R.D.D. No. 261, V95-02904 (Nov. 26, 1997) (Can.) (determining a Ukrainian woman trafficked

174

into prostitution by Ukrainian organized criminals to be a member of a particular social group,
namely "impoverished young women from the former Soviet Union"); SB [20081 UKAIT 00002,
available at http:// www.ait.gov.uk/Pubic/Upload/j2087/00002_ukait 2008 sb moldova-Cg.doc
(concluding that "former victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation" were members of a
particular social group); Cour nationale du droit d'asile [CNDA] [National Asylum Court] Apr. 29,
2011, No. 10012810 (Fr.) (granting refugee status to claimant as a member of the particular social
group: "prostitutes who come from the State of Edo and who are both victims of human
trafficking and anxious to extricate themselves actively from these networks").
See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (1991);

i75

Australian Dep't of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Refugees and Humanitarian Visa
Applicants: Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision-Makers (1996); Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Bd., Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution
(2003); Swedish Migration Bd., Gender-Based Persecution: Guidelines for Investigation and
Evaluation of the Needs of Women for Protection (2001); U.K. Home Office, Asylum Policy
Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim (2006); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Considerations for
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women (1995); U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Serv., Guidance on Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims (2009).
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Judgment, 400 (Feb. 22, 2001),
aff'd, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment (June 12, 2002); see also Marlise Simons,
U.N. Court,for First Time, Defines Rape As War Crime, N. Y. TIMEs, Jun. 28, 1996, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/28/world/un-court-r- first-timedefines-rape4-warcrime.html.
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selective enforcement of the law have been explored in a number of cases. For
example, the applicant in Kbawar.
claims that the violence is tolerated and condoned; not merely at a local
level by corrupt, or inefficient, or lazy, or under-resourced police, but as an
aspect of systematic discrimination against women, involving selective
enforcement of the law, which amounts to a failure of the state of Pakistan
176
to discharge its responsibilities to protect women.

In another Australian case, the Refugee Review Tribunal granted refugee
protection to a Filipina woman fleeing domestic violence in her home country
on the basis of her being a member of the particular social group of women.
Tribunal Member Lesley Hunt described how shared immutable and social
characteristics bind women as a particular social group per se.
That domestic violence.., is regarded in many countries as a private
problem rather than a public crime, can be directly attributed to women's
social status; to the fact that historically, in many societies, women have
been, and in many instances still are, regarded as being the private property
of firstly their fathers then their husbands ...

whilst there does exist

separation in lifestyles, values, political leaning, etc., women share a defined
social status and as such are differentially dealt with by society as a group. It
is women's social status that often leads to the failure of state protection,
177
and this is particularly so with regard to domestic violence.

Canadian adjudicators frequently identify highly particularized social
groups defined by a combination of gender, nationality, and personal
circumstance. Examples of these formulations that Canadian courts have
recognized as grounds for granting refugee protection include: "women who are
subject to domestic violence in Ecuador"; 178 "Trinidadian women subject to wife
abuse"; 179 "Bulgarian women vulnerable to wife abuse by men with government

176

Khawar,supra note 118, at

25.

177

N93/00656

Refugee

178

(Australian

Tribunal, Aug. 3, 1994) (Austl.) available at
http://www.austii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/RRTA/1994/1580.html.
Narvaez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [19951 2 F.C. 55 (Can.), availableat
http://recueil.cmf.gc.ca/eng/1995/1995fcaO185.html (holding that Board erred in not accepting
that "women in Ecuador subject to domestic violence" belong to a particular social group); see also
Diluna v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 29 IN1ti.. L.R. 2d 156 (Can.
F.C.T.D.) (holding that CRDD erred in not finding that "women subjected to domestic violence
in Brazil" constitute a particular social group).
Review

179 Mayers, Marcel v. MEI, [1992] 97 D.L.R 4th 729 (Can. F.C.A.D), aff'd, Canada (Minister of

Employment and Immigration) v. Mayers, [19931 1 F.C. 154 (Can. C.A.) (Federal Court of Appeal
ruled that there was some evidence upon which a tribunal might find that the appellant belonged
to a social group comprised of "Trinidadian women subject to wife abuse"), available at
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/1993/1993fca0448.html.
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influence";' 80 and "Westernized Tajik woman in a society moving towards
Islamic orthodoxy, with no male protection,"' 81 to note just a few.' 82
The U.K. House of Lords has recognized that domestic violence victims
denied adequate state protection could receive asylum and that "women" from
relevant states could comprise a PSG.'83 In 1999, the Lords deemed in Shah that
two Pakistani women were harmed by their husbands for personal reasons but
found that the applicants were denied state protection in Pakistan because of
their gender, supplying the nexus to the particular social group of Pakistani
women.'84 Lord Hoffman explained that the central issue in determining the
relevant social group was Pakistani women's deprivation of human rights.'85 In
post-Shah decisions, the U.K.'s Immigration and Asylum Chamber has rejected
women per se as particular social groups from applicants in certain states, usually
on the ground that women's treatment in these states was better than Pakistani
women's treatment in Shah.'86 However, applicants from some states with
egregious gender persecution have received asylum on the basis of membership
in a PSG:' 87 for example, the Court of Appeal found that the Ethiopian
it rarely prosecuted
government was complicit in gender persecution because
88
rapes and offered a statutory marital rape exception.'
Spain's case law also supports granting asylum to claimants who request
protection based on gender persecution by non-state actors. The National High
Court granted refugee status to an Algerian woman who alleged physical and
mental abuse inflicted on her and her children by her husband, ruling that

180 C.R.D.D. T92-09592, Sept. 14, 1993 (Can.), summary available at http://www.refworld.org/
pdfid/4713831e2.pdf) (claimant granted protection as Convention refugee).
181 Re J, C.R.D.D. T93-04176 et al., Dec. 7, 1993 (Can.), summary available at http://
www.refworld.org/pdfid/4713831e2.pdf (Refugee Division found claimant belonged to PSG).
182 See also Re ZEK, C.R.D.D. T98-05518 10, Dec. 3, 1998 (Can.) (finding that claimant was a
member of particular social group of "abused women in Jamaica who are unable to avail
themselves of the strict provisions of the law, which on the face of it might appear to provide
some measure of protection"), summary available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/
4713831e2.pdf.
183 See Ex Parte Shah, supra note 161.
184 See id.
at 654.
185

See id.at 652.

186 Brendan Kelly, What Is a 'ParicularSocial Group"? A Review ofthe Development ofthe Refugee Convention
in England, 24 J. IMMIGR. AsYLUM & NAT'LITY L., 9, 12-13 (2010) (Albania, Latvia, Turkey,
Tajikistan, Bangladesh, Ecuador).
187 See, for example, RG (Ethiopia) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [20061 EWCA (Civ) 339,
[45]-[461; P&M (Kenya) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1640, [21],
[37]; NL (Pak.) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 12002] UKAIT 04408, [91.
188 See RG (Ethiopia), supra note 187.
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gender persecution is included in the Convention's PSG ground because both
"sex" and "women" can be considered social groups.' 89
PSG issues connected to domestic violence have been controversial in the
U.S. While years of litigation and very slow rulemaking have not yet yielded the
precise legal guidance needed, the Department of Homeland Security argued in
an unusual brief to the administrative appellate Board of Immigration Appeals
that the agency believes that women of a particular nationality who are (1) in
domestic relationships they are unable to leave or (2) viewed as property by
virtue of their position in a domestic relationship, may constitute a particular
social group under the refugee definition. 190 In 2014, the Board issued a
precedential decision holding that "married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship" constituted a cognizable particular social
group. 191
The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women urges states to
fulfill their obligation to eliminate violence against women. 192 It specifically
presses states to take protective measures against persecution of women by nonstate actors, noting:
International human rights law requires a state to take measures-such as
by legislation and administrative practices-to control, regulate, investigate,
and prosecute actions by non-state actors that violate the human rights of
those within the territory of that state. These actions by non-state actors do
not have to be attributed to the state, rather this responsibility is part of the
state's obligation to exercise due diligence to protect the rights of all persons
193
in a state's territory.
Claims based on family membership or family status have similarly been
found to fall into the PSG framework. Such claims include membership within a
family or couple that is involved in honor killings;9 procreation, either for
couples or one member of the couple only;' 95 and forced marriage. 196 It is well
189 S.A.N., Jan. 13, 2009 (No. 1528/2007) (Spain).
190 See DHS Brief supra note 171, at 14.

191 Matter ofA-R-C-G, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 388-389 (BIA 2014).
See UN Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Report of the
.Specal Rapporteur on Violence Against Women: Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/23/49, 111 (2013).
193 Id.
14 (quoting Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders:
State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human
Rights Law, 70 MODERN L. REv. 618 (2007)).
194 Seefor example, 1209126 [20131 RRTA 109 (Ausd.); Migrations6verdomstolen [Migration Court of
Appeal] 2011-03-09 UM 3363-10 & 3367-10 (Swed.).
195 See, for example, He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2003); AX (Family Planning Scheme)
China CG [20121 UKUT 97 (JAC) (16 Apr. 2012); A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic
Affairs, supra note 159.
192
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established that a family can constitute a PSG; the main issue with these claims is
whether fear of persecution is connected to the individual's status as a family
member.'9 7
Claims based on age have included claims of "black children," or children
born of an unauthorized marriage and in contravention of China's one-child
policy; 198 street children; 99 and abandoned children.2 0 The Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Tribunal recognized a young Sri Lankan boy who
faced a serious possibility of forced conscription as a child soldier and decided
that he was a Convention refugee based on his membership in a PSG.20
Sexual orientation claims have become increasingly prominent and
20 3
2 2
accepted. Recognized PSGs in this area have included gay men, " lesbians,
bisexuals, 2 4 and transgendered individuals. 2 ' The interpretation of this term of

196 See, for example, Verwaltungsgericht Augsburg [VG] [Administrative Court of Augsburg] June 16,
2011, AU 6 K 30092 (Ger.); Verwaltungsgericht Oldenburg [VG] [Administrative Court of
Oldenburg] Apr. 13, 2011, 3 A 2966/09 (Ger.); Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VG]
[Administrative Court of Stuttgart] Mar. 14, 2011, A 11 K 553/10 (Get.) ("unmarried women
from families whose traditional self-image demands forced marriage").
197 SeeJudit Sebok, supra note 123, at 5; MinisterforImmigration &MulticulturalAffairs v Sarrazola (1999)

i98

F.C.A. 1134 (Ausd.) (finding that claimant whose family was threatened by a Colombian
organized crime organization responsible for the death of her brother, is a member of a PSG
based on her family membership; granting a protection visa, even though her brother's death was
not motivated for a Convention reason); Liwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding
parents of Burmese student dissidents a PSG).
See Chen Shi Hai, supra note 129.

199 See Matter of B-F-O-, A78 677 043, (B.I.A. Nov. 6, 2001); LQ Afghanistan v. Sec'y of State for

200

the Home Dep't. [2008] UKAIT 0005 (15 Mar. 2007); U.N. High Comm'r. for Refugees,
Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(3)
of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. No.
HCR/GIP/09/08 49 (2009).
See Re MZJ, No. V97-03500, [1999] C.R.D.D. No. 118 (Can.).

201 See Savundaranayaga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] F.C. 31
202

21 (Can.).

See HJ (Iran) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [20101 UKSC 31, [20111 1 A.C. 596, 643 (gay man

from Iran); Verwaltungsgeticht K6ln [VG] [Administrative Court of K6ln] Sept. 15, 2011, 18 K
6103/10.A (Get.) (gay man from Guinea); Amfani v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cit. 2003)
(imputed PSG-Ghanaian mistakenly believed to be gay); Nejvyi sprivni soud zed ne
05.10.2006 (NSS) [Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Oct. 5, 2006], 6j. 2 Azs
66/2006-52 (Czech) (gay man from Armenia).
203 See Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2007) (lesbian woman from Uganda);
Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart [VG] [Administrative Court Stuttgart] June 29, 2006, A 11 K 10841
(Ger.) (lesbian woman from Iran).
204 See Valoczki v. Canada, [2004] F.C. 492 (Can. Ont.) (bisexual woman from Hungary).
205

See Ornelas Chavez v. GonZale7, 458 F.3d 1052 (9th Cit. 2006) (transgender woman from Mexico);
Asylgetichtshof [Asylum Court] Feb. 24, 2011, A4 213316-0/2008 (Austria) (transgender woman
from Egypt).
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art as it applies to sexual orientation has evolved. Around 1980, for example,
Dutch and Canadian courts disagreed
as to whether "sexual disposition" could
20 6
constitute a particular social group.
Other accepted PSGs today range from slaves 0. to clan members2 °8 to
groups based on "former" status, such as former government personnel who
possess classified information, 209 police officers, 210 and child soldiers.211
Given the worldwide prominence of gangs, new PSGs have arisen in
connection with those targeted by gang-based violence. Gangs try to recruit the
very young, 212 marginal youth (poor and often homeless), and single women or
women heads of household with children. 21 3 Rebuffing such recruitment and
refusing to pay extortion demands are considered insults and acts of serious
disrespect in gang culture.21 4 Persistent refusal to join often triggers increasing

206

Richard Plender, International Migration Law 422 (2nd ed. 1988).

207

See Conseil du Contentieux des Etranger [CCE] [Council for Alien Law Litigation] June 9, 2011,

208

Nr. 62.867 (BeIg.).
See Verwaltungsgericht Minchen

209

11.30081 (Ger.) (member of Somali Wadaan clan); Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, Int.
Dec. 3795, 2014 WL 524499 (B.I.A.2014); Matter of H, 21 1. & N. Dec. 337, Int. Dec. 3276, 1996
WL 291910 (B.I.A. 1996) (members of Marehan subclan in Somalia); Migrationsdomstolen
[F6rvaltningsritten i Malmtl [Migration Court Malm6[ 2011-07-13 UM 1238-11 (Swed.) (Bidoons
in Kuwait).
See Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2006) (former personnel of Colombia's Attorney

210

General's office who possessed valuable, classified information); Velarde v. INS, 140 F.3d 1305
(9th Cir.1998) (former bodyguard to daughters of Peruvian President); Koudriachova v. Gonzales,
490 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2007) (defected from the KGB Intelligence Service); Garciav. Atty Gen., 665
F.3d 496 (3rd Cir. 2011) (civilian witnesses who assisted law enforcement against violent gangs in
Guatemala).
See Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000) (former member of Peruvian

[VG]

[Administrative Court Miinchen] Sept. 21, 2011, M 11 K

National Police); Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 1988 WL 235456 (B.I.A. 1988) (former
members of the National Police of El Salvador); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233, Int.
Dec. 2986, 1985 WL 56042 (B.I.A. 1985) ("former military leadership"); Nejvyi sprfivni soud
zed ne 02.08.2012 (NSS) [Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Aug. 2, 2012], j. 5
Azs 2/2012-49 (Czech) ("persons involved in Iraqi army and other armed bodies before the fall
of Saddam Hussein's regime"); see also Sergio Garcia, Aylum for Former Mexican Police Officers
Persecutedby the Narcos, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 245 (2011).
211 See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cit. 2003) ("former child soldier who escaped LRA
212

captivity').
See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Issue Paper Youth Gang

Oganizationsin El Salvador6 Oune 2007).
213 See CIDEHUM/UNHCR, supra note 78, at 29-30; U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidance

214

Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs 2 (2010), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4bb21 fa02.html [hereinafter UNHCR Gang Guidance Note].
See Boerman, supra note 85; UNHCR Gang GuidanceNote, supra note 213, at 2.
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violence because it is seen as a challenge to the respect and reputation that gang
members depend on to thrive.215
Even when children succumb to the pressure to join gangs, the persecution
that they face does not cease. Youth, particularly those with tattoos, presumed to
be gang members are most likely to be targeted by the police, rival gangs, and
death squads engaged in "social cleansing. ' 216 "[H]aving one or more tattoos
renders a person suspicious in the eyes of the police and of society at large;
tattooed youths in particular face discrimination and run a high risk of being
attacked as gang members., 217 At one point during the Salvadoran government's
Mano Dura campaign, the Anti-Gangs Act of 2003 specified that being tattooed
218 In some cases, the police have killed persons
established gang membership.
2 19
spot.
the
on
with tattoos
Gang-related claims for protection are one of the most controversial areas
of refugee law today in the U.S., 22° the U.K.,221 Australia, 222 and Canada. 223 Some

215

See Boulton, supra note 98, at 16-17.

216

No PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN

217

(Laura Pedraza Farina, Spring Miller & James L. Cavallaro eds., 2010).
Id. at 182.

218

Seeid. at 110-13.

El.

SAI.VADOR

181-82

219

Seeid.at 186-91.

220

See, for example, Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2005); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec.
579 (B.1.A. 2008); In re Orozco-Polanco, File No. A75-244-012, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev.
of El Paso, TX, 123-23 (Dec. 18, 1997). Much of the current juridical debate in the U.S., for
example, centers on issues regarding "social visibility or distinction" and "particularity." First,
there is a debate as to whether the refugee definition requires more than a showing that a claimant
fears persecution in connection with an immutable characteristic or one that is so fundamental to
an individual's identity that they should not be forced to change. See A -M-E-&J-G-U- , 24 1. &
N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), afid, Ucelo-GomeZ v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2007); C-A-, 23
I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), affd, Castillo- Aias v.Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cit.
2006). At present, there is a circuit split. See Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.
2010) (upholding both social visibility and particularity requirements and rejecting the proposed
social group of "young women recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment");
ValdivieZo-Galdamez v. Alt) General, 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cit. 2011) (joining the Seventh Circuit in
rejecting visibility and particularity concepts); Crespin-Valladaresv. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cit.
2011) (upholding particularity test, but declining to rule on social visibility while noting circuit
split), Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521-22 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding social visibility
and particularity tests). Second, where "social visibility or distinction" and "particularity" are
required, judges differ with regard to the meaning of these terms. See Contreras-Martine
Z v. Holder,
346 F. App'x 956, 958 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59
(1st Cir. 2009)) ("[The Board requires that a particular social group have... 'social visibility,
meaning that members possess characteristics ... visible and recognizable by others in the native
country."'). But see Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) ("'he
Board cited cases
which hold that a group must have 'social visibility' to be a 'particular social group,' meaning that
'members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social
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states have begun to recognize as refugees individuals who fear persecution in
connection with gangs, while others have rejected that understanding of the
Refugee Convention. I would argue that such struggles to determine just who
merits protection demonstrate the evolving nature of persecution and the
ongoing viability of a definition created over sixty years ago.
In recent years, Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board granted
Convention protection to a journalist who was targeted by an organized crime
group as a result of articles he had written.224 Australia's Refugee Tribunal
granted protection to an applicant based on a fear of persecution as a result of
pursuing an occupation (public transport drivers) targeted by gangs to pay
extortionate demands.225 But adjudicators in Canada and the U.K. have also
rejected other gang-related claims.226
As of now, many gang-related claims in the U.S. are rejected with respect
to membership in a particular social group. But a close look reveals that in
certain gang-related cases, claimants may be eligible for protection. U.S. federal
courts have held or indicated support for the concept that membership in a
particular social group can involve the following gang-related circumstances:
witnesses who have testified against gang members;22 family members of such
witnesses;.28 family members of those who resist forcible recruitment; 229 and

221

group."'). The BIA itself has now clarified that social "visibility" does not mean "ocular" visibility
but rather that the group is perceived by society as distinct. Matter of M-E-V-G-,supra note 208.
VM (Kenya) v. Secy of Statefor the Home Dept [2008] UKAIT 00049, [2141 ("Appellant has a well-

222

founded fear of being persecuted in her home area in Kenya at the hands of members of the
Mungiki, from whom the state is unwilling or unable to protect her, by reason of her membership
of the particular social group 'women in Kenya' (alternatively 'intact women (girls))").
RRT Case No. 0906782 (2009) R.R.T.A. 1063 (Ausd.) (concluding that the reason "bus, public

223

transport and truck drivers are targeted [by MS-13 and MS-1 8 in El Salvador] is their membership
of the particular social group they comprise").
RPD File No. TA7-04670, TA7-04671, TA7-04672 (Private Proceedings), [2008] CanLIl 49548

224

225

(Can. I.R.B.) journalists who have investigated crimes committed by gangs.).
See id.at 5. The Board found that the claimant "should not be expected to abandon his vocation
and go into hiding in another location in Mexico." Id.
See RRT Case No. 0906782, supra note 222, 84 (where the recognized particular social group was

227

"bus, public transport, and truck drivers').
Seefor example, Orphde v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] F.C. 966, [20]
(Can.) (dismissing a claim from a taxi driver on the basis that the 'vocation of taxi driver does not
constitute an innate characteristic or one that is fundamental to human dignity"); Emilia Del
Socorro Gntierrez GomeZ v. Sec_) of State for the Home Deft [2000] UKIAT 00007, [ 73(111)] (refusing
to recognize participants in community-based group that provides legal advice to victims of gang
extortion).
See Garcia,supranote 209.

228

See Crespin-Valladares, spra note 220.

229

See Hernandeg-Avalos v. Lnch, No. 14-1331 (4th Cir., April 30, 2015)..

226
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former gang members.2 3 ° One immigration judge held that tattooed youth in
such circumstances constitute a particular social group.2 3' Another immigration
Judge found an Evangelical Christian eligible for asylum in connection with gang
persecution.232
As explained earlier, much has changed since the General Assembly
adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention in response to Nazi and Soviet
persecution. Governments continue to persecute but also create refugees when
they prove to be ineffective at protecting their citizens from non-state agents of
persecution. Moreover, those non-state agents come in many forms. Some act
like governments and control territory and the lives of those who reside under
their de facto jurisdiction. Others persecute nuclear family members in societies
that enable men to treat women, girls, and boys as property.
While both state and non-state agents target some of the same individuals
and groups, many new refugees flee particularly from non-state actors. This is
especially the case with respect to targeting connected to gender, sexual
orientation, age, and family, as described above.
Identifying the new refugees is an ongoing challenge for states and civil
society. Not surprisingly, jurists, advocates, UNHCR, and experts disagree in
robust ways over recognizing new targets of persecution. But through such
contestation, Member States have determined that many new refugees, too,
merit the protection provided by the 1951 Convention.
V. WHAT HAS ENABLED THE REFUGEE CONVENTION TO
ADAPT TO CHANGES OVER TIME?
What has made it possible for this treaty to evolve with respect to new
agents, forms, and targets of persecution? The State Parties created a treaty with
two core and interlocking characteristics enabling this development: a special
purpose that goes to the fundamental nature of the state system, and terms that
possess a reasonable degree of flexibility. Recognizing these traits, lawyers have
continuously adapted the refugee definition to new circumstances.

230

231

232

See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cit. 2009); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 36667 (6th Cir. 2010).
See Decision of Immigration Judge Steven A. Morley, York Immigration Court, Sept. 13, 2012,
available at http://d.dropboxusercontent.com/u/27924754/IJ%2Morley/o209-13-12 / 20pro%
20se%20withholding.pdf.
See Decision of Immigration Judge Wayne R. Iskra, Arlington Immigration Court, Aug. 10, 2012
(copy on file with author; non-binding). For more information on gang and drug-related violence
in Mexico, see Holly Buchanan, Fleeing the Drug War Next Door Drug-Related Violence As a Basis for
Refugee Protectionfor Mexican Aylum-Seekers, 27 UTRECHTJ. INT'L. & EUROPEAN L. 28 (2011).
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First, the Convention focused on one of the central purposes of the
modern state: to protect citizens and residents from serious harm in connection
with personal characteristics or fundamental beliefs and opinions. Of course, a
treaty's purpose generally matters under international norms. According to the
Vienna Convention, states must interpret treaties in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and "in the light of its
' As Professor Steinbock
object and purpose."233
explains, the object and purpose
are grounded in the terms of the treaty; the terms cannot be fully understood
outside that context.234 He refers to Professor Brownlie's "principle of
integration," which holds that the meaning of the terms "emerges in the context
of the treaty as a whole and in light of its objects and purposes.""2 3 According to
Steinbock, "[t]his is especially so when the textual approach leaves the decisionmaker with a choice of possible meanings. 236
Steinbock identifies the protection of the innocent as one important
purpose of the Refugee Convention. "The core concept of the refugee definition
is protection against the infliction of harm on the basis of differences in personal
status or characteristics."2 3 Steinbock locates this purpose "within what is
probably the most prevalent theme of post-1945 human rights law: nondiscrimination."2'38 As Steinbock argues, the object and purpose of the Refugee
Convention is to protect an individual targeted in connection with any status or
characteristic that is a discriminatory and irrelevant basis for the infliction of
harm. 239 The object and purpose itself means that the refugee definition is
applicable to a "wide variety of social statuses and affiliations. '2"" As such, the
object and purpose enable the refugee definition to respond to "evolving forms
of oppression. "241
Second, in addition to establishing a special purpose, states created the
refugee definition with "flexible" terms that make it open to a variety of
interpretations.242 While that allows adjudicators to apply the treaty to new forms
233

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 116, art. 31.

234

See Daniel Steinbock, The Refugee Definition as Law: Issues of Inteipretaion,in REFUGEE RIGHTS
REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND REGIMES

235

& Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
Id. at 19 (internal citation omitted).

236

Id.at 20.

237

Id.at 21.

238

Id.

239

See id.at 34.

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

See Sztucki, supranote 12, at 58.

AND

13, 19-20 (Frances Nicholson
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and targets of persecution, commentators have noted that it also enables
instability: "numerous amendments to national immigration and refugee
legislation, which do not in any case follow the same pattern, have demonstrated
the 'flexibility', or rather the instabiliy, of the substance of the Convention
definition., 243 Critics of the 1951 Convention's definitions have argued that
vague wording has forced states to come up with2 their own definitions,
including both expansive and restrictive interpretations. "
Certainly, adjudicators, advocates, experts, and officials debate and disagree
about the meaning of these terms. At the same time, consider the ways in which
adjudicators have applied the refugee definition to non-state agents of
persecution and new forms and targets of serious harm over time. Lord
Hoffman analyzed this characteristic with respect to membership in a particular
social group in the Shah case:
[11he concept of a social group is a general one and its meaning cannot be
confined to those social groups which the framers of the Convention may
have had in mind. In choosing to use the general term "particular social
group" rather than an enumeration of specific social groups, the framers of
the Convention were in my opinion intending to include whatever groups
might be regarded as coming within the anti-discriminatory objectives of the
5
Convention. 24
In the same case, Lord Hope explained that the evolutionary approach
enables adjudicators to take into account societal changes as well as persecutory
forms of discrimination of which the treaty negotiators were unaware.24 6 In
short, the terms possess adequate flexibility to adapt to changed
circumstances.24 7
Finally, lawyers have played a crucial role in understanding and applying
the object and purpose of the refugee definition as well as its flexibility to
changing times. This happened almost from the start when the first major
European refugee crisis occurred following Western support for and Soviet
repression of the Hungarian rebellion in 1956, as explained above. UNHCR's
top lawyer, Dr. Weis, applied the Refugee Convention to the already-changing
243

Id. at 75 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

244

See, for example, Millbank, The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at 8,

245

16.
Ex Parte Shah, supra note 161, at 15.

246

See Ex Parte Shah, supra note 161, at 21.

247

One of the leading refugee law scholars, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, finds some of the 1951
Convention refugee definition criteria to be clear-cut, and others to be "open." "These latter must
inevitably be filled out by human experience; there are new groups of refugees, as there always
have been new groups of refugees." Professor Goodwin-Gill makes these observations in
response to those who view the Convention as a "relic from a bygone era." Guy S.Goodwin-Gill,
Editorial: Aylum 2001 -A Convention and a Purpose, 13 INT'L J. oF RiEFUGiE LAW 1, 7 (2001).
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times then, as the chief legal advisors to the High Commissioner have continued
to do to this day.
UNHCR's Protection Division (today's legal department) has contributed
legal analyses to help guide state behavior through the Handbooks on Voluntary
Repatriation,24 8 Emergencies,249 and Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees,2"' as well as guidance on such subjects as claims to refugee
status based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity,2"' child asylum
claims,252 and religion-based refugee claims.253 The Division directed the Global
Consultations discussed above to meet the six main goals of its program of
action: strengthening implementation of the 1951 Convention and its 1967
Protocol, protecting refugees within broader migration movements, sharing
burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to receive
and protect refugees, addressing security-related concerns more effectively,
redoubling the search for durable solutions, and meeting the protection needs of
refugee women and children.2 54 UNHCR lawyers also argue their interpretations
of significant refugee definition issues in amicus briefs and other court
submissions in the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and elsewhere. For example,
UNHCR has explained its understanding of membership in a particular social
group, 2 55 immigration detention, 25 6 well founded fear of persecution, 2 11 gender-
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U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Voluntag , Repatriation: InternationalProtection (1996), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b351O.html.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook for Emergencies, (3rd ed., 2007), availabk at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/46a9e29a2.html.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for

252

Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. No. HCR/IP/4/ENG/REV. 3 (2011), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to
Refugee Status Based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N.
Doc. No. HCR/GIP/12/01 (2012), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/50348afc2.html.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 199.
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U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 6: Religion-Based
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Refugee Claims under Article IA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. No. HCR/GIP/04/06 (2004), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4090f9794.html.
See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Global Consultations on International Protection: The End
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of the Beginning, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d98491d4.htm.
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See The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of
Petitioner, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 449 F. App'x. 626 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-71571), available
at http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/ files/Henriquez-Rivas%2OUNHCR%
20Brief.pdf.
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based persecution, 58 and internal armed conflict.259 Protection Division lawyers
have written thoughtfully about specific definitional matters, as Volker Turk did
regarding non-state persecutors discussed earlier. In the tradition of UNHCR
legal analysis approaching the new forms of persecution and persecutors, Turk
argues that the Convention wording on persecution possesses an open and
flexible character° that enables it to adapt to changing circumstances and forms
26
of persecution.
Advocates have contributed significantly to our evolving understanding of
the Convention refugee definition. Practitioners and NGOs have articulated
legal arguments demonstrating how the refugee definition applies to a particular
individual persecuted by a non-state actor in connection with a protected status
or characteristic. Leadership and lawyering at non-governmental organizations
have made a difference in how adjudicators and policy makers have interpreted
this treaty to apply to the new refugees.261
Scholars have brought special expertise to bear on analyzing the refugee
definition. It is not uncommon for the high courts of various jurisdictions to
refer to the analyses that these experts provide.262 When UNHCR sought to
256

See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, U.N.H.C.R. Intervention before the Court of Justice of the
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European Union in Joined Cases of NS and ME and Others, U.N. Doc. C-411/10 and C-493/10
(2011), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4elbl0bc2.html; U.N. High Comm'r for
Refugees, U.N.H.C.R. Oral Intervention before the European Court of Human Rights in the
Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2010), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/
4c7fbf052.html.
See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, U.N.H.C.R. Public Statement in Relation to Cases Federal
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Republic of Germany v Y (Case C-71/11) and Federal Republic of Germany v Z (Case C-99/11)
Pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (2011), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dfb7a082.html.
See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR Intervention before the United States Court of
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Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the Case of Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, Att'y General, U.N.
Doc. No. 10-9527 (2010), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 4c6cdb512.html; U.N.
High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR Intervention Before the House of Lords in the Case of
Zainab Esther Fornah (Appellant) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (Respondent)
(2006), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 45631a0f4.html.
See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR Public Statement in Relation to Cases UM 8628-
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08, UM 334-09, UM 133-09 Pending Before the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal (2009),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4acb46d82.html.
Turk, supra note 111, at §4.2.
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Many NGO's-too many to name-have made a difference in this way, such as Human Rights
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First (formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), the Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, and the various national Refugee
Councils.
For example, Guy Goodwin-Gill advised on legal issues of statelessness and "returnability" in the
case of North Koreans seeking asylum in the U.K. and the scope of exclusion under Article 1F(c)
of the 1951 Convention. Sec) of Statefor the Home Dep't v. AlJedda [2013] UKSC 62 (9 Oct. 2013);
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engage states in the new millennium on significant protection issues related to
the interpretation of the refugee definition, the agency called on well-recognized
scholars to provide their analyses as the basis for discussions, asked these
experts to further develop their studies based on those roundtables, and then
published their work in Refugee Protectionin InternationalLaw.263
Ultimately, as the above analysis demonstrates, judges have determined that
the Convention is applicable to new agents, forms, and targets of persecution.
The evolution of interpretations has benefitted at times from the comparative
law discussions of this international treaty as it has been applied through
domestic legal systems. According to Judge North of the Federal Court of
Australia and his co-author, "the people who are best equipped to persuade
'
judges are fellow jurists and experts." 264
Some national high courts have been
particularly open to consider the analyses of other high courts and at times adopt
such interpretations. 65 Certainly the International Association of Refugee Law
Judges (IARLJ), made up of jurists throughout the world who focus on
interpreting the Convention definition, has contributed to a serious exchange of
ideas through their world conferences and publications. In fact, one can argue
that the challenges of understanding the refugee definition in light of changing
circumstances led to the very establishment of this organization in 1997.266
VI. CONCLUSION
The Refugee Convention and Protocol constitute the major human rights
treaty on cross-border forced migration. The International Law Commission's
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R (DD (Afghanistan))v. Secy of Statefor the Home Dep', [20121 UKSC 54. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 6th Circuit cited James Hathaway's book, The Law of Refugee Status, in Stenaj v. Gonzales, 227
F. App'x 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2007), regarding human rights violations as evidence of persecution.
Erica Feller, Volker Turk & Frances Nicholson, Refugee Protection in International Law (2003).
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Anthony M. North & Joyce Chia, Towards Convergence in the Interpretation of the Refugee
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Convention: A Proposal for the Establishment of an International Judicial Commission for
Refugees, in THE UNHCR AND THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 226, 242
(james C. Simeon ed., 2007).
See, for example, Ex Parte Shah, supra note 161, at 8; Ward, sipra note 163; A v. Minister for
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Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, supra note 159.
The IARLJ Constitution states that:

U] udges

and quasi-judicial decision makers in all regions of the world have a
special role to play in ensuring that persons seeking protection outside their
country of origin find the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as
other international and regional instruments applied fairly, consistently, and in
accordance with the rule of law.
One of the major goals of the association is to promote "a common understanding of refugee law
principles" to jurists worldwide. The 1ARLJ Constitution is available at http://www.iarlj.org/
general/iarlj/the-association/constitution/english.
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project on examining treaties over time explained the need for studying such
significant international agreements as follows:
As important treaties reach a certain age, in particular law-making treaties of
the post-1945 era, the context in which they operate becomes different
from the one in which they were conceived... As their context evolves,
treaties face the danger of either being 'frozen' into a state in which they are
less capable of fulfilling their object and purpose, or of losing their
foundation in the agreement of the parties.... Subsequent agreement and
subsequent practice aim at finding a flexible approach to treaty application
267
and interpretation, one that is at the same time rational and predictable.

The Special Rapporteur on "subsequent agreements and subsequent
practice in relation to treaty interpretation" based his first report on "the
jurisprudence of a, hopefully, representative group of international courts,
tribunals and other adjudicative bodies, as well as on documented instances of
State practice.,

268

This expert found numerous instances where jurists and other

decision makers applied an evolutive interpretation of a treaty provision to
address changing contexts. The adjudicative bodies that have done so, often
guided by Articles 31 through 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, include the Human Rights Committee,2 69 the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea,27 the European Court of Human Rights,271 the International
Court of Justice,"' and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 273
The Special Rapporteur sums up this issue by stating that "o]n balance, the
jurisprudence of ICJ and arbitral tribunals does not seem to contradict the
'general support among the leading writers today for evolutive interpretation of
2 74
treaties,' as the Tribunal in the Iron Rhine case has noted.
The present Article has focused on one particular treaty and its
interpretation by domestic and regional tribunals and agencies. The analysis
presented here confirms the Special Rapporteur's conclusion that "subsequent
practice by the parties may guide an evolutive interpretation of a treaty.""27 As
demonstrated by the above analysis, the parties to the Refugee Convention have
adapted this agreement-created in 1951 to address a particular European
267
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Comm'n, 60th Sess., May 5-June 6,July7-Aug. 8, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, Annex A, 14.
Treaties and Subsequent Practice 5 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013).
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refugee situation-to changes over time with respect to new agents, forms, and
targets of persecution. The treaty itself set out a clear purpose concerning a
fundamental function of the state system as well as terms with sufficient
flexibility that have enabled jurists and government officials-aided, prodded,
and persuaded in many cases by advocates, UNHCR, and experts-to adapt the
refugee definition to the changing nature of forced migration.
Of course, the treaty continues to protect those fleeing certain types of
state persecution much like it did at the outset. But the State Parties that created
and adopted the Refugee Convention could not have imagined the changing
nature of persecution in its particularities. We now know that states and nonstate actors continue to develop new ways and targets to persecute, and that
identifying the new refugees can be difficult. While figuring out who the new
targets are involves challenging legal analyses and debates, this treaty's capacity
to protect both the old and the new refugees today deserves recognition.
As long as the modern state system exists, one of its principal goals will
continue to be the protection of citizens and residents. As policy makers,
advocates, and experts consider how states can best address the needs of those
displaced in connection with natural disasters and climate change, they would
benefit from taking into account how the Refugee Convention has evolved over
time. Focused on persecutory discrimination, the Refugee Convention has
proven capable of protecting the new targets of persecution from new kinds of
persecutors when these vulnerable individuals have sought the protection of
another state. While some individuals displaced by natural disasters and climate
change may be "persecuted" in connection with a characteristic protected by the
Refugee Convention, the vast majority of these newest forced migrants will need
new norms developed to address their unique situations. No doubt what is
understood now in connection with disasters and climate change will evolve
over time. Any new norms developed to ensure that states address the needs of
these displaced persons should be capable of adapting to such changes.
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